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A 1998 paper that delineated desirable characteristics, or desiderata for controlled medical terminologies attempted to summarize
emerging consensus regarding structural issues of such terminologies. Among the Desiderata was a call for terminologies to be ‘‘concept
oriented.’’ Since then, research has trended toward the extension of terminologies into ontologies. A paper by Smith, entitled ‘‘From
Concepts to Clinical Reality: An Essay on the Benchmarking of Biomedical Terminologies’’ urges a realist approach that seeks termi-
nologies composed of universals, rather than concepts. The current paper addresses issues raised by Smith and attempts to extend the
Desiderata, not away from concepts, but towards recognition that concepts and universals must both be embraced and can coexist peace-
ably in controlled terminologies. To that end, additional Desiderata are deﬁned that deal with the purpose, rather than the structure, of
controlled medical terminologies.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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It would be a rare biomedical information system that
did not require some means for representing data and/or
knowledge in a formal, reproducible, and useful way. The
uses can be quite varied but they all require some capability
for symbolic manipulation. Otherwise, why bother with
controlled representation when one could just store raw
signals? At the simplest level, symbolic manipulation
at least requires a set of symbols (often referred to as
identiﬁers) that distinguish the various elements of data
and knowledge. Human-understandable labels (often
referred to as terms) for these elements are not always
required,1 but they are usually deemed convenient, if for
no other reason than the need to map human-collected
data into symbols and to map symbols into human-usable1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.11.008
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1 Consider, for example, the nodes in a hidden layer of a neural network.
Each node represents coordination of values from input nodes and
conveys some information to the output nodes, but we do not characterize
these nodes as corresponding to any real or conceptual intermediate entity.results. Sets of these symbols and labels (or terms and iden-
tiﬁers) are usually referred to as controlled terminologies.
The design and content of controlled terminologies are
quite diverse but, ultimately, they serve some common pur-
poses: they must support the capture, storage, manipula-
tion, and retrieval of the information they represent in
ways that faithfully preserve and communicate the original
information. The construction of a controlled terminology
does not always guarantee that successful representation
will occur; some approaches will predictably work better
than others. Biomedical informatics researchers have been
studying and describing these approaches for decades. One
attempt to synthesize and summarize that body of work,
written in the late 1990s, identiﬁed 12 desiderata that
reﬂected the ideas of many researchers of the time [1].
One of the key points in the Desiderata was that termi-
nologies should focus not only on the names of the data
and knowledge elements they intended to represent, but
also on their underlying meanings. The term ‘‘meaning’’
has several deﬁnitions (or meanings!), including ‘‘the thing
one intends to convey especially by language’’ [2]. How one
conveys these ‘‘things’’ may be accomplished by various
methods, depending on what that thing is. For example,
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person or automobile), its meaning might be conveyed by a
proper noun or some unique identiﬁer (e.g., the persons
name or the automobiles registration number). If the thing
is a generalization of some particular set of things in reality
(that is, a universal that has some extension, or set of
instances in reality), its meaning might be conveyed by a
general term for the things or by some set of characteristics
that all these things have in common (e.g., ‘‘person’’ or
‘‘passenger vehicle, self-propelled, four wheels . . .’’—of
course, this raises the need to deﬁne these additional
terms). Finally, if the thing is an idea, we might refer to
it with some description of the idea or by describing the
particular instances on which the idea is based.
A particular term is not restricted to a single method for
the conveyance of its meanings. Depending on how the
thing to which the term corresponds is viewed, it might
have multiple aspects that could be conveyed in multiple
ways. For example, a controlled terminology for speaking
about celestial bodies might contain a term with the name
‘‘solar planet,’’ the meaning of which might be expressed
by referring to a list of known planets (‘‘any of Mercury,
Venus, Earth . . .’’) or by a intentional deﬁnition (‘‘a large
body that orbits around the Sun’’).2
The names (terms) used for these things usually serve the
purpose of conveying the meanings, when the reader has
appropriate background knowledge. The Desiderata
attempted to stress the fact that something more formal
than the language-speciﬁc linguistic shorthand with which
humans are comfortable was required to convey meanings
in useful ways. Speciﬁcally, some formal representation to
convey the intended meanings of the data and knowledge
elements was requested. Formal representations could,
themselves, be represented symbolically (that is, using a
controlled terminology) and would be independent of the
fashions of language. In the ‘‘solar planet’’ example above,
this might be accomplished by including in the terminology
elements corresponding to each of the planets, by including
elements that correspond to the Sun and the notion of
orbit, or by both.
While the formal representation of terms constitutes a
type of knowledge, the Desiderata stopped short of using
the word ‘‘ontology’’ to refer to this knowledge. This omis-
sion was due, in part, to the absence of the term in the
reviewed informatics literature, although speakers at the
time sometimes referred to it [3], usually as ‘‘the O Word’’
because of the perceived overuse of the term by the com-
puter science community [4,5]. Instead, the Desiderata
attempted to describe this focus on meanings to be ‘‘con-
cept oriented.’’ The use of ‘‘concept’’ was chosen as a
way to refer to the meanings of the symbols, as understood
by humans. But, the notion of ‘‘concept’’—an abstract idea2 With the recent discovery of a new large body orbiting the Sun outside
the orbit of Pluto, the extentional meaning will need to be updated with
some reference to the new body, which will be awkward until it is named;
meanwhile, the intentional meaning remains valid.generalized from speciﬁc instances [2]—is only one aspect
of the data and knowledge items that we might wish to rep-
resent. As a result, while the Desiderata may be interpreted
narrowly, in fact, the work from which they were synthe-
sized related to broader aspects of symbolic representation.
2. Aconceptual terminologies
In ‘‘From Concepts to Clinical Reality: An Essay on the
Benchmarking of Biomedical Terminologies’’ [6], Smith
holds that terminologies should not rely on the use of con-
cepts. He is troubled by the fact that concepts can be
viewed linguistically, psychologically, epistemologically,
and ontologically. He sees concept-oriented terminologies,
on the one hand, as collections of elements that may or
may not correspond to things in reality and, on the other
hand, as little more than groupings of the synonymous
terms by which humans express ideas.
Smith provides many examples of ways in which termi-
nologies composed of expressions of ideas lead to diﬃcul-
ties: in one, taken from Campbell et alias description of
the National Library of Medicines (NLM) Uniﬁed Medi-
cal Language System (UMLS), ‘‘aspirin’’ and ‘‘Aspergum’’
refer to the same meaningful element in the UMLSs Meta-
thesaurus [7]. He holds this paradox to be an artifact of the
‘‘conceptualist’’ view.
He prefers to focus, instead, on terminologies composed
of references to universals only, and to their corresponding
instances in reality—what he calls the ‘‘realist’’ view. In this
view—which assumes that there is only one, universal
objective reality—only things in reality would be consid-
ered, such as pieces of Aspergum and portions of aspirin.
Each of these objects would be instances of one of two,
mutually exclusive universals (a universal of gum products
made from aspirin, perhaps called ‘‘Aspergum,’’ and uni-
versal of portions of aspirin, perhaps called ‘‘aspirin’’).
More general universals would be considered (such as ‘‘as-
pirin-containing drugs’’ and ‘‘organic acids’’) which would
also extend to real world objects, including (respectively)
pieces of Aspergum and portions of aspirin. All of this is
done without the messiness of concepts and without any
confusion of what is the chewable thing and what belongs
on a chemists shelf.
3. What is on the side of the patient
Smith considers clinical terminologies, in particular, as
domains where concept-orientation should be eschewed
in deference to realism. It is natural to consider that a
patient in reality has real attributes that can be described
and used to support activities such as diagnostic and
therapeutic decision-making. Each of these (the patient
and the attributes) would be represented in a biomedical
terminology as a universal. These universals might or
might not have names associated with them as linguistic
dressing. The important thing is that their meanings are
determined solely by their extensions in reality, not by
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about reality.
Strong arguments can be made for the ontological puri-
ty of this approach and for the clarity by which it can sup-
port reasoning. After all, the reality is what it is, and is not
perverted by the fashionable views of society. A patient
who behaves in the same particular manner from year to
year might be labeled as having a psychological disease
one year, as having a personality disorder the next year,
and to be a normal variant the year after that, without
any change in the actual patient. Recording the manner-
isms themselves, rather than some momentary conceptual
perspective, allows us to reconsider past information in
the past (and future) contexts, as our understanding of
the causes of the mannerisms becomes better understood.
In fact, one of the novel ideas in Ledley and Lusteds
1950 landmark paper was a call for the use of such primary
patient attributes for automated medical diagnosis [8].
This approach is strengthened by including unique iden-
tiﬁers not just in the terminology of universals but ‘‘on the
side of the patient’’—that is, each attribute of the patient is,
itself, a unique entity in reality and is assigned its own iden-
tiﬁer. When a patients temperature is measured, the mea-
surement is an instantaneous entity (a perdurant), while
the polyps seen on colonoscopy are persisting entities
(endurants); each is given an identiﬁer by which they can
be referenced, so that multiple temperature measurements
can be related to each other and individual polyps can be
followed over time.
4. Terminologies of universals
The notion of terminologies that are limited to well-be-
haved universals, each one clearly understood because of
its extension in reality, is appealing and, if possible, would
make the lives of clinical system developers much simpler.
In fact, many patient records today do, to a limited extent,
implicitly represent patient information as extensions in
reality, as discussed below, through their data models.
While a clinical record may appear to capture that, as
Smith charges, a physician ﬁts together a patient and a con-
cept (e.g., a disease), the clinical record is usually capturing
(with some unique identiﬁer composed of time, patient,
physician, and concept) that at some point in time, the phy-
sician is observing attributes of the patient that leads the
physician to believe that the signs the patient is manifesting
are evidence that the patient has some disease. Thus, while
the concept may appear to be separate from the patient,
there is a deeper connection that is implied by the design
of the patient record [9].
The idea of unique identiﬁers for aspects ‘‘on the side of
the patient’’ that are instances of universals in the terminol-
ogy is not entirely new. Clinical laboratory systems have
long included controlled terminologies for specimens. The
terms in such terminologies arguably correspond to univer-
sals, since they have extensions in reality, in the form of
actual instances of specimens collected from actualpatients. When an actual specimen is collected from an
actual patient, it is assigned a unique identiﬁer (at New
York Presbyterian Hospital, these are called ‘‘accession
numbers’’). Using such identiﬁers, it is possible to perform
multiple measurements on the same specimen (to check for
consistency), to perform diﬀerent measurements on the
same specimen (to correlate ﬁndings), and to report multi-
ple results on the same specimen (such as preliminary and
ﬁnal results). It is even possible to invalidate a previous
measurement, if some problem with an analysis is
discovered.
The idea of uniquely enumerating each of the patients
problems can be traced back to Weeds landmark paper
on problem-oriented medical records [10], later implement-
ed in his PROMIS system. A more elaborate example of
unique identiﬁers for patient attributes can be found in a
paper by Barrows and Johnson [11] that describes the
assignment of persistent identiﬁers to patient problems.
As a particular problem (or the understanding of the prob-
lem) evolves over time, new interpretations can be assigned
without losing the reference to the original problem. Smith
promotes the extension of this approach (as proposed with
Ceusters and Smith [12]) to permeate the patient record.
Everything about the patient that is medically salient
receives a unique identiﬁer instance that relates it back to
a universal in the terminology.
The tokenization of the entire patient record in this way
is a bold proposal and, if technically feasible, would open
up entire new pathways to patient care, epidemiology,
quality assurance, and various other ways to use and reuse
patient data. There is no question that such recording
should be done more often than it is now, and that coded
electronic record systems as they exist today actually do
obliterate some of the instance-recording that occurs in
patient care. Most notably, eﬀort spent on encoding bill-
able diagnoses and procedures divert valuable resources
away from recording the ‘‘what it is on the side of the
patient’’ in favor of data that are less-resusable [13].
I set aside here questions of whether the complete exten-
sion of this approach can actually be accomplished without
paralyzing care providers with attribute-identiﬁcation tasks
(will endoscopists tattoo each polyp so that they can iden-
tify them later?) and how such an approach could be stud-
ied to gather evidence of its cost-eﬀectiveness and safety.
More immediately, we must consider whether a terminolo-
gy that supports this approach can truly be composed of
only universals and not include what have been traditional-
ly understood as conceptual entities.
Laboratory specimen terminologies, as they exist today,
typically do not include deﬁnitional information about the
various specimens (collection methods, equipment used,
body parts collected, etc.) beyond their name (e.g., ‘‘blue
top blood specimen’’). However, the meanings of these
terms are generally understood, at least to the laboratory
technicians, and these meanings are based on general attri-
butes (e.g., ‘‘5 ml test tube with heparin and venous blood
from the patient’’) rather than a set of extensions in reality
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terminology could include terms for specimens that dont
actually exist in reality (‘‘blue top saliva specimen’’). Such
terms would not be included for reasons of pure fantasy
(such as support for a pathologist-turned-ﬁction writer),
but rather in anticipation of the eventual occurrence of
such a specimen [14]. While there is no need to precoordi-
nate every possible permutation of body part and collec-
tion method, there is a need to create terms in a
terminology for specimens that will soon be needed, but
for which no actual instance yet exists. Thus, if we assume
that recording what is on the side of the patient will involve
instances of laboratory specimens collected from the
patient, and that the laboratory information system would
beneﬁt from having some controlled set of well-deﬁned
terms for universals to process the actual specimens, we
cannot escape the practical need to include terms for things
that do not yet actually exist—that is, terms that are, at
least temporarily, purely conceptual. The alternative, to
add a new specimen term to the laboratory systems termi-
nology when the ﬁrst instance of specimen is created, is
simply not practical: laboratory systems dictate to the clini-
cians which specimens are allowed, not the other way
around.
Other attribute domains may prove equally messy when
trying to limit a terminology to a set of terms for univer-
sals. For example, the clinical collection of patient temper-
ature is a routine procedure that will continue regardless of
how we represent the resulting data. Recording a number
of degrees in the patient record, along with a unique iden-
tiﬁer for that recording, is not suﬃcient for the information
to be used in care of the patient; somehow, the notion that
it is a body temperature must be conveyed. To really know
the patients body temperature, we would need to know the
kinetic energy of every one of the patients molecules. Any
measurement process that attempted to detect this would
(according to Heisenberg) render the result moot by
destroying the patient. Instead, we use a device that detects,
imperfectly, the average kinetic energy of a small subset of
the patients molecules. From this, we make a guess at the
patients actual temperature, taking into account that the
reliability of our estimate is further inﬂuenced by the oriﬁce
containing the aforementioned molecules. I submit, then,
that when we record a patients temperature, we can only
do so through reference to concepts; we do not have the
luxury of ‘‘real’’ universals. We might allow that since this
is the best approximation we can make, that patient body
temperature is, for all intents and purposes, a universal,
or we can acknowledge that we use the instances of mea-
surements to help us create a conceptual representation
from which we can reason. The result—what we think we
are dealing with and what we do about it—is the same.
The advantages of an imperfect universal over an imperfect
concept are not self-evident.
Patient temperatures are sometimes needed as primary
parameters for patient management, such as hypo- and
hyperthermia. Most of the time, however, the temperatureis used as a proxy for detecting and monitoring underlying
conditions. We speak of the term of ‘‘fever’’ and its more
speciﬁc, yet less-well-deﬁned term ‘‘low-grade fever.’’ If
these terms correspond to the ways we think about various
states of patient temperature, then they are concepts. Can
we at least do away with these concepts and reason from
ﬁrst principles about our patients? This approach is appeal-
ing, until we consider that we dont have much of a clue
about the ﬁrst principles that relate disease processes to
particular values of body temperature. Is a patient with a
temperature of 39 C twice as sick as a patient with a tem-
perature of 38 C, or only 2.6% sicker? Of course, neither is
the case, but we have no algorithm nor body of experience
with which to characterize patient states based on temper-
ature. Instead, we mentally convert temperature measure-
ments into conceptual representations of the patients
true body temperature (as above) and then further use con-
cepts like ‘‘low-grade fever’’ to help us match patients tac-
itly to conceptual patterns that correspond to various
disease states (such as mild upper respiratory tract infec-
tion—a cold).
The medical literature that is part of the foundation of
clinical education, and the original studies on which that
literature is based have been derived in part from patient
data that were recorded conceptually, rather than realisti-
cally. Perhaps past behavior is no excuse: if we begin today
to record patient data through the exclusive use of observa-
tions on the side of the patient, we might eventually reach
some point at which we can compare a patient before us
with our experience by matching patient attributes, rather
than concepts. Homer Warner and others have argued that
such data should be the basis for logical diagnostic reason-
ing, rather than reliance on abstractions that are the prod-
uct of human experts, no matter how experienced [15].
5. What is on the side of the clinician
Even if we are to discard the past hundred years or so of
clinical literature, we are still faced with the fact that
human beings reason based, necessarily, on concepts; the
best clinical reasoners rely on tacit knowledge that not only
is conceptual in nature but is, by deﬁnition, inexpressible
[16,17]. Our eventual liberation from the vagaries of human
expert reasoners may not relieve us of this reliance on con-
ceptual representations. When Warner attempted to inte-
grate his diagnostic expert system with his clinical
information system, he found the mapping of patient data
to clinical concepts to be a signiﬁcant challenge [18].
Consider, for example, ‘‘severe acute respiratory syn-
drome’’ (SARS). When the condition ﬁrst arose, we might
have chosen to deﬁne this term based on a set of actual
cases in reality that shared a set of particular attributes
(i.e., certain clinical manifestations with particular geo-
graphic and chronological characteristics). While such
characteristics were certainly true for each individual
patient, we must also consider how clinicians dealt with
this condition. Did they hold in their minds the unique
3 This error originated with the general assumption that, if a UMLS
source terminology considers two terms to be synonymous, and no other
source terminology treated them as distinct concepts, then the UMLS
would perpetuate the synonymy. In the Medical Subject Headings
(MeSH), ‘‘Aspergum’’ was listed as an Entry Term that pointed to the
MeSH Heading ‘‘Aspirin’’ as the preferred term to use for indexing (i.e.,
‘‘Aspergum: see Aspirin’’). Entry Terms may be synonyms of the MeSH
Headings to which they refer, but they are not necessarily so, as in this
case. But, because no other UMLS Source Terminology, at the time,
contained the term ‘‘Aspergum’’ as an entity distinct form ‘‘Aspirin,’’ they
were automatically assumed to be synonymous.
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abstract representation, based on their understanding of
the disease at the time? It is certainly the latter, for without
the conceptual representation, they would have no way to
consider cases that ﬁt some of the pattern of the disease
without having all of the characteristics of the initial
cases—for example, they would have to treat cases arising
in Canada as a diﬀerent set of instances of a diﬀerent uni-
versal, since they do not match the previously identiﬁed
geographic characteristics. Smith does not say how we
would know to relax those constraints to recognize these
cases as being instances of the SARS universal. Humans,
however, achieve such reclassiﬁcation readily, even
subconsciously.
Instead, clinicians made use of a SARS concept, which
included conjectures, such as ‘‘probably viral.’’ This
allowed them to consider aspects that would not be evoked
solely by the then-known characteristics of the individual
cases—for example, the recognition of cases that ﬁt the pat-
tern but not the deﬁnition based on known cases. Canadian
SARS cases can be classiﬁed as such according to the con-
ceptual representation, allowing us to relax the geographic
constraints retroactively. It is ﬁtting, then, that a controlled
terminology contain terms corresponding to such concepts,
to record, in the patients record, what diagnosis the clini-
cian is considering at some point in time. If new informa-
tion arises, the clinician might discard the previous
diagnosis and consider a new one. The terminology can
be employed to record both considerations.
6. If universals are insuﬃcient, can we live with concepts?
We appear to be in a quandary: Smith would like us to
work with patient information at the instance level, and
reason with universals, thus avoiding the muddiness inher-
ent in concept-level representation in reasoning. However,
we are trapped into using concepts, as long as we deal with
human reasoners (and their computer systems) and are not
able to escape them when dealing with human patients (as
per the fever example, above). Perhaps, though, things may
not be as bleak as they seem.
An analysis of the great aspirin–Aspergum controver-
sy leads to the conclusion that it is a problem not of
semantics but of language. It is possible that someone,
somewhere, refers to this chewable product of the Insight
Pharmaceutical Corporation (Plymouth Meeting, PA) as
‘‘aspirin.’’ This is an example of the rhetorical device
known as synecdoche, in which a general word or phrase
is used to stand in for a more speciﬁc one (or vice versa).
In this case, there is no conceptual dilemma—when the
speaker says ‘‘aspirin,’’ he is actually attempting to com-
municate a meaning that is synonymous with the mean-
ing generally associated with ‘‘Aspergum.’’ That he risks
being misunderstood is merely the eﬀect of the ambigui-
ties that beset human language. Had he, instead, used
some agreed upon identiﬁer (whether a code or an
agreed-upon name, recognized by speaker and listeneras being a unique preferred term in a controlled termi-
nology), there would be no conceptual dissonance.
Another possibility (and the one that is involved in this
particular example) is that there was an error in judgment
during the construction of the UMLS that led to the merg-
ing of two meanings, such that the same unique identiﬁer
was assigned to both meanings (and their corresponding
terms)—an example of spurious synonymy—what the
Desiderata called ambiguity. I believe that Smith would
argue that this is precisely his point: attempting conceptual
orientation inevitably leads to such muddiness. This may
be as true of concept orientation as any other orientation,
but in this case the error was a systematic one that concept-
orientation itself actually helped to resolve. It seems that,
at the time that terms for drug products were added to
the UMLS, they were simply treated as instances of chem-
icals and were therefore indistinguishable from the chemi-
cals from which they were composed (Nelson, personal
communication).3
Eventually, the NLM determined that two meanings
were present—one that referred to an organic acid (a chem-
ical) and one that referred to a drug (a manufactured
object). The NLM determined that the chemicals and man-
ufactured objects were mutually exclusive semantic types;
therefore, the assignment of these two meanings to the
same identiﬁer could automatically be determined to repre-
sent ambiguity. Today, the UMLS contains two separate
unique identiﬁers to which these terms are assigned.
I believe that other apparent contradictions in concept
representation can be peaceably resolved when they are dis-
covered, not by throwing them away and replacing them
with something that extends to collections of real-world
instances, but by doing the hard work of understanding
their intended meaning(s) and purpose(s) to resolve the
contradictions through improved representation. It is my
experience that not only can concepts and universals coex-
ist in the same controlled terminology, but that this is a
desirable situation.
By way of example, consider the Medical Entities Dic-
tionary (MED), the controlled terminology used at New
York Presbyterian Hospital [19]. The MED needs identiﬁ-
ers for a wide variety of entities that are represented in
patient records, including laboratory tests, laboratory spec-
imens, radiological and cardiologic procedures, and diag-
noses. Some of these can be considered to be universals
(such as laboratory tests, medications, and the aforemen-
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diagnoses). There is certainly room for many more univer-
sals, should some method be developed for recording more
instances on the side of the patient. Meanwhile, far too lit-
tle is understood about the diseases represented by the
diagnosis terms for us to represent them as universals, yet
they are far too useful to discard.
The MED attempts to adhere to the Desiderata,
including the use of formal deﬁnitions. While these deﬁ-
nitions are present for a only subset of terms in the
MED, and while the MED has been rightfully denied
the characterization of ‘‘ontology’’ [20], it nevertheless
contains ontological information and it provides anMedical E
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sults displays and laboratory tests) and ‘‘has test part’’ (between laboratory
‘‘Therapeutic Drug Level Display’’ refer to concepts used by the clinical
shows results for digoxin tests, as well as other tests not shown here, such
e battery of blood tests that includes the ‘‘NYH Lab Procedure: Digoxin,’’
’ and ‘‘NYH Lab Procedure: Magnesium.’’ For clarity, some high-level
Diagnostic Procedure’’ and between ‘‘Medical Entity’’ and ‘‘Pharmacy
bstance.’’ ‘‘NYH’’ stands for ‘‘New York Hospital’’, a part of New York
r, is available at http://onto.cpmc.columbia.edu/medsite/med1.htm.
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Although the Desiderata might be construed to be some
kind of commandments (‘‘no false gods’’—concept orienta-
tion, ‘‘thou shalt not kill’’—concept permanence, ‘‘honor
thy father and thy mother’’—multiple hierarchies, and so
on), they were only a synthesis of contemporary thought.
At the time they were presented (at the 1997 IMIA Work-
ing Group 6 conference, in Jacksonville, Florida), the only
objection raised was to the rejection of ‘‘not elsewhere clas-
siﬁed’’ (NEC) terms [24]. Eight years later, at a subsequent
meeting in Rome of the same working group, the NEC
issue was not even raised, most likely because the general
consensus is now that such terms are antithetical to
ontologies.4
It is a given that our knowledge expands and evolves.
Our knowledge about knowledge is subject to this same
evolutionary force. But rather than discard what we have
learned to replace it with this alternative world view, I
believe that we can expand our understanding of how con-
trolled biomedical terminologies might be further devel-
oped to embrace both perspectives. Smith chooses a path
he calls ‘‘realism.’’ One cynical deﬁnition of reality is
‘‘The dream of a mad philosopher’’ [25]. A more balanced
deﬁnition is ‘‘the totality of real things and events; some-
thing that is neither derivative nor dependent but exists
necessarily’’ [2]. I suggest a path that acknowledges the
importance of representing reality, as best we can know
it, but accepts the need for concepts to help us, among
other things, reason under uncertainty. I consider this the
realistic path.
In the realistic approach, terminologies contain terms
that refer to universals and to concepts, along with various
names and unique identiﬁers for these. Sometimes, a single
term will refer to an entity that has both universal and con-
ceptual characteristics. Terminologies also contain, to the
fullest extent possible, ontological information to include
what we know about the meanings of the terms and the
entities that they represent. That ontological information
for terms referring to concepts is, as Smith argues, prob-
lematic; I argue that it is no more problematic than onto-
logical information for terms referring to universals. In
any case, being problematic does not render such informa-
tion valueless and should not dissuade us from including it
where we can.
We therefore consider some desirable characteristics of
controlled biomedical terminologies that address not the
structural and content issues of the original Desiderata,
but their purpose:
(1) Terminologies should support capturing what is known
about the patient. This is at the level of what is actually4 While the terms continue to exist, they are generally recognized to refer
not to disease concepts or universals, but to instances of utterances made
by clinicians when describing their beliefs and actions about a particular
patient case.observed, not just how we interpret our observations or
what we infer. For example, when recording the medica-
tion given to a patient, we should record the speciﬁc
product—‘‘Aspergum,’’ for example, when it is known.
However, when such details are not know, we will need
the terminology to provide us with a more general
term—‘‘aspirin preparation,’’ for example.
(2) Terminologies should support retrieval. This has
implications for the how the terminology is used at the
time of data recording and at the time of querying. In
both settings, we should strive to make the meanings
of the terms universally understood; linguistic represen-
tation should support, rather than obfuscate, this under-
standing. For example, although ‘‘aspirin’’ is often a
shorthand form of the term ‘‘aspirin preparation,’’ the
terminology should make the distinction between the
two terms clear to the person recording a patients med-
ications, such that someone later encountering the infor-
mation in the patients record will be able to determine
the meaning intended by the recorder.
(3) Terminologies should allow storage, retrieval, and
transfer of information with as little information loss as
possible. This has implications for how terminologies
evolve over time, while the data they are used to record
remain as frozen artifacts. Changes in terminologies
should not hamper our understanding of what was
stored on the side of the patient. For example, many
medical products that contained phenylpropanol-
amine—a drug that has been prohibited by the US Food
and Drug Administration—have continued to be manu-
factured with a substitute ingredient (pseudoephedrine).
While the names of these medications have not changed,
the identiﬁers used to refer to them must change, so that
we can know, from a patients medical record, which
form of the medication the patient received.
(4) Terminologies should support aggregation of data.
While we want our terminologies to support those
who record data, we must recognize the legitimate needs
for abstraction of data, perhaps from multiple perspec-
tives. For example, if we want to know which patients
are taking aspirin preparations, we will want to be able
to identify those patients whose records contain ‘‘Asper-
gum’’ (or any of a large number of other speciﬁc prod-
ucts), as well as those whose records merely show that
they are taking an ‘‘aspirin preparation.’’
(5) Terminologies should support reuse of data. Users of
data may wish to consider transformations other than
simple aggregation, using what is known about the
terms by which the data are recorded. For example, if
we wish to know whether a patient is taking an anti-
platelet agent, an antipyretic, an analgesic, or a nonste-
roidal anti-inﬂammatory agent, we would want to be
able to identify our Aspergum-taking patient as such.
(6) Terminologies should support inferencing. The knowl-
edge underlying the terms used to record data should be
compatible with knowledge used for conceptual repre-
sentations for reasoning (by humans and computers),
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ter can be accomplished. We need to be able to reach
across from what is on the side of the patient to use it
on the side of the clinician; terminologies can help.
For example, we would like to be able to use the knowl-
edge that the (conceptual) condition ‘‘aspirin allergy’’ is
related to the chemical ‘‘aspirin’’ and, from that, infer
that we should be concerned about aspirin-allergic
patients (instances of a universal) who are given aspi-
rin-containing products (instances of another universal).
If we can accept that the characteristics above are rea-
sonable expectations for controlled biomedical terminolo-
gies, we can then proceed to determine how best to
realize them. We must recognize that, after all, everything
we say about the patient is, on some level, an abstraction
of reality and that how we record what we say—that is,
its context—is as important as what we say.
8. Conclusion
TheoriginalDesiderata paper discussed the entities repre-
sented by controlled terminologies without reference to
ontologies, but it nevertheless reﬂected ontological princi-
ples. While it referred to the terminologic entities as ‘‘con-
cepts,’’ it was describing desired characteristics of
universals as well. As long as we consider that the purpose
of terminologies is to support the recording and use of actual
data, rather than primarily as a pure knowledge base of what
is known in biomedicine, I believe that concepts and univer-
sals can coexist and commingle in controlled terminologies,
to the advantage of those who seek to improve patient care
through symbolic representation of patient information.
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